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The present study analyses the manner in which the subjects of transitional justice and 
access to justice are interlinked and can develop together as a means of achieving democratic 
advancement, and of facilitating sustained conflict resolution. It explores some of the key socio-
legal issues surrounding the adoption of transitional justice mechanisms through the lens of the 
principles of the Access to Justice Movement. The legal and social developments that often occur 
in post-conflict societies are notable, both for their pace and for their contribution to several 
major legal and social reforms in different areas. On the other hand, transitional justice 
mechanisms have been criticised for their backward tenor – for instance, the decision of whether 
dispute resolution mechanisms should be left to the victims of previous conflicts can prove 
controversial. 
 It is argued here that the principles of access to justice and the recourse to alternative 
dispute resolution can play an important and valuable role in post-conflict society. In particular, it 
is proposed that transitional justice strategies should draw upon access to justice and offer the 
opportunity to the victims of conflict and injustices relating from it, to choose the dispute 
resolution processes most convenient and appropriate for their own disputes: both formal and 
informal justice need to be made available. Generally speaking, an important development of the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution movement has been to move beyond the word alternative, and 
towards the word appropriate. Therefore, the current challenge of transitional justice strategies is 
to locate the appropriate dispute resolution process for each dispute involving individuals and 
communities in countries affected by conflict or in need of democratic progress. 
 The present paper is inspired by the idea that transitional strategies are not confined to the 
simple resolution of disputes. Instead, transitional strategies in conflict and post-conflict societies 
should aim at addressing broader issues involved in the conflict at hand. Conflicts and disputes do 
not occur within a vacuum. In parallel to procedural issues, transitional strategies also involve 
socio-legal discourses. Felstiner, Abel and Sarat (1980-81: 631) all point out that not all injustices 
end up being disputes because ‘disputes are not things: they are social constructs’.  Several 
important social factors contribute to the recognition and consciousness of ‘wrong’ and to the 
subsequent requests for restitution or reconciliation which may follow. Felstiner, Abel and Sarat 
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(1980-81) go so far as to set down a social paradigm of the transformation of disputes. This 
paradigm is based on three stages: naming, which entails consciousness of the wrong that has 
been caused; blaming, which involves the identification of the offender who has caused the 
wrong; claiming, which comprises a request for compensation for the wrong committed. 
Therefore, transitional strategies should pay attention to social barriers, including shame and 
indifference, which often limit remedial action and influence court rulings. Accordingly, the 
recourse to access to justice and ADR as opposed to formal justice mechanisms, represents a 
fundamental tool for transitional justice strategies in contextualising strategy and addressing the 
wide range of issues and complexities involved in conflict and post-conflict societies. 
The present study will articulate the scope of transitional justice and access to justice 
concepts, which are often presented either very broadly, or conversely, overly narrowly. The study 
will then turn to the way in which these two concepts are intertwined, and finally, it will look at 
selected case studies demonstrating examples of transitional justice models and selected issues in 
the field of access to justice. This paper offers two main themes in its explanation of the 
relationship between transitional justice and access to justice. Firstly, the study considers the 
extent and limitations of the notion of individual autonomy. It is argued that the notion of 
individual autonomy can and should include procedural autonomy. Here it suffices to say that 
autonomy is meant to encompass the possibility for private citizens to have their personal rights 
considered and vindicated in court. The autonomy of each individual includes entitlement to 
human rights and the possibility of litigating in court for such rights. Secondly, the study points out 
that an important evolution in the access to justice approach and within Alternative Dispute 
Resolution has been the so-called process of ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’ (Sander and Goldberg, 
1994: 49), such that parties should be free to resolve their differences through the appropriate 




The literature on transitional justice suggests several definitions of the term ‘transitional 
justice’. However, few are comprehensive enough, and many are inaccurate. Using a definition 
offered by Roht-Arriaza, in the present paper transitional justice is taken to include ‘that set of 
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practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or 
repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law’.1 In addition, the present study suggests that transitional justice 
should endeavour to include potential sources of future conflicts and violations. 
 Transitional justice emerged as subject of study at the end of 1970s, with the end of 
dictatorships in Greece and Spain. Later on, research began to explore post-conflict and post-
dictatorship societies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa. The range of mechanisms and 
instruments adopted to undertake transitional justice is broad and today includes: truth and 
reconciliation commissions; criminal courts; trials (formal and informal); vetting; lustration; 
reparation; restorative justice; amnesty; apology; reburials of victims; compensation of victims; 
writing and pardon among others. It must be emphasised that the list of transitional stretegies is 
not fixed. In addition, in several cases, the above mentioned instruments have been mixed, 
creating multifaced models, as those created in Colombia, Peru and Mexico,2 and hybrid 
instruments as iin the case of Timor Leste (2006). It must also be taken into account that in an era 
of globalisation, transitional justice strategies will be subject to the discourse of the diffusion of 
law.3 
 
Access to Justice 
 
The term 'Access to Justice' is generally interpreted under hte presumption that justice can 
only be secured through the courts. The present study embraces the original meaning of access to 
justice, as provided by Mauro Cappelletti in the late 1970s. Cappelletti and Garth in a ‘General 
Report’ given in the publication Access to Justice4 consider access to justice to be ‘the system by 
which people may vindicate their rights and/or resolve their disputes under the general auspices 
of the state. First, the system must be equally accessible to all, and second, it must lead to results 
                                                          
1 ROHT-ARRIAZA, Naomi and MARIEZCURRENA, Javier (eds) (2006) “Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2 For a general overview on the manner in which different transitional mechanisms have been mixed see: Roht-Arriaza, N., 
and Mariezcurrena, J. (2006). Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
3 TWINING, William (2009) “General Jurisprudence. Understanding Law from a Global Perspective”, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
4 Access to Justice as a publication consists of six books divided into four volumes. The publication gathers the findings of 
comparative research into access to justice, as a conclusion to the Florence Project of Access to Justice, coordinated by 
Mauro Cappelletti. The Florence Project was supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, the Italian Research Council, 
and the Ford Foundation.  
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that are individually and socially just’.5 This understanding of access to justice represents both a 
theoretical approach and a methodological device. It is comparative in nature and inclusive of 
several ‘modalities and diverse institutional settings crystallized with the flourishing of the 
Florence Access to Justice Project’.6 With reference to the Access to Justice Movement as a 
theoretical approach, the present study embraces the idea that ‘what becomes predominant is the 
accessibility of the procedural phenomenon to the individual, to the groups, to society generally’.7 
 As Cappelletti and  Garth point out, access to justice may be characterised as involving 
‘waves of legal reform aiming at making rights effective’.8 They indentify three waves of legal 
reform worldwide, which have come to characterise the Access to Justice Movement. The waves 
have not been static, and have developed alongside one another. The first wave involves legal aid 
to the poor; the second involves bringing so-called ‘public interest’ cases for the protection of 
diffuse interests; and the third wave, commonly named the access to justice approach, aims at 
reforming civil procedure and encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution methods. One 
of the main contributions of the access to justice movement to the study of law and dispute 
resolution is the focus it places on the parties to the dispute as being the primary protagonists, on 
whom analysis should concentrate. As a consequence of this, the dispute resolution process now 
has to take into account, and be shaped according to the characteristics and goals of the parties 
themselves. An important evolution in the access to justice approach and in that of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution has been the so-called process of ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’, as described 
above,9 such that in cases of disputes the parties should be free to resolve their differences 
through the appropriate forum of dispute resolution. 
 The link between transitional justice and access to justice starts and has developed from 
the original three waves of the Access to Justice Movement. As such, it aims to overcome barriers 
to legal aid, ensure the representation of diffuse interests in court, and promote a broad 
understanding and implementation of different dispute resolution processes. At the same, given 
the social and legal complexity of many post conflict countries which experience systems of 
                                                          
5 CAPPELLETTI, Mauro and Bryant, GARTH (1978) “General Report” in M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH (eds), Access to 
Justice. A World Survey, Vol.I, Milano: Giuffr’ Editore, 1-80.  
6 GALANTER, M. (2010). “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capabilit”. Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 37, 
116. 
7 CAPPELLETTI, M. (1992). “Access to Justice as a Theoretical Approach to Law and a Practical Programme for Reform”. South 
African Law Journal, Vol. 109, pp. 22-39. 
8 CAPPELLETTI, Mauro and Bryant, GARTH (1978) “General Report” in M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH (eds), Access to 
Justice. A World Survey, Vol.I, Milano: Giuffr’ Editore, 21. 
9 SANDER, Frank E.A. and Stephen B. GOLBERG (1994). “Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an 
ADR Procedure”, Negotiation Journal, January 1994, Vol.10, No.1, 49. 
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transitional justice, the scope of the original three waves expands and more legal, procedural and 
social limits to access to justice are individuated. Indeed, Marc Galanter recently pointed out that 
the boundaries of the Access to Justice Movement are still developing.10 The Movement continues 
to develop in a way which expands the notions of justice and injustice and the meaning and 
perception of wrong, and which seeks to enlarge the range of people who take legal action. Thus, 
the implementation of the principles of Access to Justice helps transitional strategies to explore 
root causes, to tackle inequities that underlie conflict, and to take into account the needs of 
marginalised groups. In addition, Access to Justice brings strong support to civil society, as a way 
of advocating civil rights and raising awareness. Advocacy and litigation are therefore considered 
stages of the same strategy, to address the rights of social groups whose rights have been 
violated.  
Selected Examples of Transitional Justice 
 
 The present section is dedicated to the analysis of examples of transitional justice. The 
approach to transitional justice adopted here is holistic in nature and involves measures aiming at 
avoiding future conflict. It is argued that transitional justice initiatives can only work if designed for 
the local context in question, and with the full and informed involvement of the civil society as a 
whole.11 In this regard, the selected case studies presented below represent effective examples of 
reconciliation initiatives at grassroots level, which also aim at re-building a sense of community 
and shared ownership of reconciliation processes in the aftermath of conflict. 
 
Timor-Leste’s Community Reconciliation Processes12 
 
 Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)13 was created 
following the conflict and forced displacement that followed the granting of independence of what 
                                                          
10 GALANTER, Marc (2010). “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”. Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 
37. 
11 The involvement of civil society in transitional strategies has been considered as a fundamental step in any strategy by Kofi 
Annan: (2004). Report of the Secretary-General of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN 
Doc. S/2004/616. Regarding the civil society participation see also: Lambourne, Wendy (2012) 'Outreach, Inreach and 
Civil Society Participation in Transitional Justice', in Palmer, Nicola, Clark, Phil and Granville, Danielle (eds) Critical 
Perspective in Transitional Justice, Cambridge: Intersentia. 
12 See UNDP (2004). The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, 
report for UNDP Timor-Leste by Piers Pigou. Available at: 
http://www.cavrtimorleste.org/Analysis/Laporan%20Piers%20tentang%20CRP.pdf. 
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was then known as East Timor, from Indonesia in 1999. The truth commission was proposed to the 
United Nations by a group of main political parties within Timor-Leste, and was founded on 
principles gleaned from a variety of truth commission models from around the world, 
incorporating an inclusive and consultative approach and taking its lead from a steering 
committee formed of civil society actors, human rights groups, women’s organisatios, religious 
groups and representatives from the main political parties of Timor-Leste.14 The Commission’s 
main objective was to inquire into human rights violations committed during the political conflict 
that took place in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999, and it was given a two-year mandate. 
 The Community Reconciliation Processes (CRPs) of Timor-Leste were created with the 
specific aim of dealing with disputes between victims and perpretators of violence, engaging 
individuals and communities from all sides of the conflict. Another main function was that of 
facilitating the return and incorporation of ‘low-level’ perpetrators into their communities. The 
possibility of recourse to CRPs was established by the United Nations Transitional Administration 
for East Timor (UNTAET)15 Regulation 2001/10, which provided for perpretators of violence to 
present a statement to the Commission (CAVR), with the admission of responsibility regarding a 
past committed violent act. Statements were sent to and analysed by the national office of the 
CAVR, then considered by a Statement Committee, which would decide whether the case could be 
presented to the CRPs. Once determined as a matter that could in fact be considered by the CRPs, 
hearings would be organised. Hearings in Timor-Leste saw the participation of the entire 
community, and were supervised by a panel of local leaders. Section 32 Regulation 2001/10 rules 
that ‘in principle, serious criminal offences, in particular murder, torture and sexual offences, shall 
not be dealt with in a CRP.’ Almost 8,000 statements were received in total (approximately one 
per cent of Timor-Leste’s total population), with numerous hearings and community reconciliation 
meetings being held throughout the country, overseen by a staff of over 300 and approximately 12 
international advisors.  
 The CRPs of Timor-Leste can be seen to represent a ‘bargain’: they offered an opportunity 
for many perpetrators to be reintegrated into their communities while also providing the 
possibility for them to offer an apology and admission of responsibility to victims and the 
community. In many cases, the return of perpetrators to their communities would be conditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
13 Portugese acronym. 
14 HAYNER, P. (2001) “Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions”. Routledge. 
15 The United Nations governed Timor-Leste during the transitional period through the United Nations Transitional 
Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). 
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on symbolic payment as compensation or upon undertaking periods of community service. The 
agreements made in the CRPs would be approved by a court, with compliance with the agreement 
resulting in the waivering of criminal and civil liabilities on the part of the perpetrator. 
 In the case of disputes between victims and perptrators, traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms called lisan were adopted in order to settle the dispute. Although ceremonies 
differed slightly from region to region, the typical cermony was that of the nahe biti boot and took 
place with the help of people seen to have a spiritual and legal role in the community, referred to 
as lia nain (‘keeper of the word’), with the presence of the community and the victim, and 
brokered through community-based panels organised through regional commissioners, all through 
the facilitation and monitoring of the Commission. Such ceremonies have their root in the 
indigenous East Timorese tradition of the adat process.  
 The lian nain (individual) would unroll a mat, signifying the start of the procedure, and it 
would be rolled again only when the parties have settled. The perpretator would be asked to make 
a public statement and to answer questions from anyone attending (this could include members 
of the public/community). After all questions were asked, the panel would decide which acts of 
reconciliation the perpretator must perfom. These acts would be varied and would often be 
performed in support of the entire community. If the decision was accepted by the deponent, the 
agreement would then be recorded as a Community Reconciliation Agreement and registered with 
the appropriate District Court (Burgess, 2006).16 
Results of the CRP programme have been largely evaluated as positive in making 
reconciliation and reparation and in terms of the level of participation by communities. Doubts on 
the trasferability of specific traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution and on the spontaneity 
of settlement remain, but the significant experience of Timor Leste clearly demonstrates the fact 
that formal and informal justice can work together. 
 
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda 
 
                                                          
16 For a general overview on the manner in which different transitional mechanisms have been mixed see: Roht-Arriaza, 
Naomi. and Mariezcurrena, Javier. (eds) (2006). Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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The recourse to traditional courts, namely Gacaca courts in Rwanda was (among other 
reasons) based on the incapacity of the formal justice system to deal with the extremely large 
number of crimes and perpetratore resulting from the civil war and subsequent genocide there, 
which left a reported 800,000 Rwandans dead and more than 130,000 suspected genocidaires in 
prison, over three times the official prison capacity.17 As a result of the overflowing prisons and 
the disintegration of the country’s judiciary, access to justice became severely hampered.18 After 
five years, cases were proceeding within the insufficiant Rwandan Court system at a pace that 
would have required 100 years to complete the processing of each case.19 Justice was not 
accessibile to victims and thousands were dying in prisons. It was in response to this situation that 
the Rwandan government, in 2005, implemented the formalisation of a traditional, grassroots 
form of justice; the Gacaca. These courts continued to process the cases of victims in Rwanda until 
their closure in May 2012.20 
 Gacaca literally means ‘small grass’; and refers to the court in which the procedure takes 
place. Gacaca judges are referred to as Inyangamugayo, literally meaning ‘those who detest 
dishonesty’.21 Nine Inyangamugayo are present, each of whom will have received specialist 
training by the state. These judges are able to impose a variety of sentences spanning community 
service to life imprisonment; the death penalty cannot be imposed (unlike in national courts). 
Members of the community are asked to ascertain facts, and may question the defendant or speak 
in support of him or her. During the hearing, anyone present can ask questions. After the hearing, 
judges release a judgement. The judgement is then signed by both parties involved in the dispute. 
Lawyers are not involved in the gacaca process; the defendant being instead prosecuted 
collectively by the community members present. Gacaca courts operate under what is referred to 
as Rwandan Organic Law (established in 1996 to facilitate prosecution of genocide crimes). In 
accordance with this law, crimes are categorised as follows; the planning and organising of 
genocide; ‘notorious’ physical perpetratore committing or assisting in the commission of murders 
                                                          
17 TIEMESSEN, A. (2004) “After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”. African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 
57. 
18 While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was successfully established following the genocide, its role 
was not that of a recourse to justice for the masses of victims. 
19 “Justice Compromised: The legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts” Human Rights Watch, 2. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf  
20 KOK, N. (2012) “The Closing of the Gacaca Courts and the implications for Access to Justice in Rwanda”, Institute for 
Security Studies. 
21 For a general overview on the manner in which different transitional mechanisms have been mixed see: Roht-Arriaza, 
Naomi. and Mariezcurrena, Javier. (eds) (2006) Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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or attaks; serious attacks without the intent to cause death; and offences against property.22 
Crimes of sexual torture or rape; planning or organising genocide and acting in positions of 
authority carry the sentences of life imprisonment or the death penalty, and are therefore tried in 
the conventional court system rather than the Gacaca. Crimes involving the physical perpetration 
of genocide and conspiring to commit genocide, and the theft of property and criminal damage 
are tried in the Gacaca.23 Sentences are based on the Gacaca Law 2001 and range from 25 years 
to life in prison, to the compensation of victims. An important aspect of the process is the apology 
that is offered by the defendant in front of the community, at the beginning of the hearing.  
 Traditionally, Gacaca courts did not deal with criminal offences. The idea of establishing 
Gacaca courts with jurisdiction over genocide was realised by President Pasteur Bizimungu and 
several stakeholders in 1998-99.24 Because of this change, the procedure and the principles on 
which settlement is based have changed, today bringing in human rights considerations. In 
addition, the participation of women and young people has also been put forward as an essential 
requirement for the inclusivity of such courts. 
 The Gacaca court process, which is now regulated by the Gacaca Law 2001 (amended in 
2004),25 is divided into two parts: the first part is dedicated to gathering information regarding 
victims of genocide and perpretators of crimes. The second phase of the process is the hearing 
itself, during which judges listen to plaintiff, witnesses, and defendant. 
 It has been argued that ‘by blending retributive and restorative approaches in an 
innovative way, Gacaca courts represent a unique opportunity to seek justice in an open, 
accessible, and participatory fashion’ (Bolocan, 2004:356). However, the work of gacaca courts 
has also been criticised because of instances of coercion of defendants, a lack of procedural 
fairness, inaccurate integration of local custom, which can result in a lack of legitimacy, and 
discrimination. Nevertheless, for our purposes it must be said that several positive aspects of the 
Gacaca remain with regards to transitional justice; namely a reduction of genocide caseload, the 
                                                          
22 TIEMESSEN, A. (2004) “After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 
61. 
23 TIEMESSEN, A. (2004) “After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 
61. 
24 LONGMAN, Timothy. (2006) “Gacaca trials in Rwanda” in ROHT-ARRIAZA, Naomi and MARIEZCURRENA Javier (eds) 
(2006) Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
25 Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca courts 
Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, 
Committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994. 
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crucial involvement of the community and civil society as a whole, use of informal dispute 
resolution processes, and attempts to restore a sense of identity.   
Achievements of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda 
 
 One of the clear successes of the Gacaca has been their contribution to the reduction of 
the enormous logistical problems faced by Rwanda’s justice system following the Genocide. Trials 
have been held in Gacaca courts in over 10,000 communities, reducing the time needed to 
address the total number of cases to a seven year period; something the national court system is 
likely to have taken over 100 years to achieve. According to estimations, almost every Rwandan 
adult has taken part in a Gacaca court hearing during this seven year period; a statistic which 
demonstrates the very accessibile nature of the justice the Gacaca have brought into 
communities.26 This combination of increasing access to justice for the population as a whole and 
individual victims through their availability, and the decreasing of the backlog that created huge 
overpopulation within prisons27 has proven to be effective. Additionally, the emphasis placed by 
the Gacaca on on community service and reintegration into communities has been successful in 
ensuring prisons do not become overpopulated again.28 
 Other advantages the Gacaca are generally seen to have over conventional justice models 
include their acceleration of trials (meaning both victims and suspects had a shorter waiting period 
to see justice served); their reduction of costs to the government in maintaining prisons; and their 
contribution to transforming a culture of impunity in Rwanda into one of accountability (and more 
rapidly than through the conventional court system).29 
 The organisation and nature of the Gacaca courts are also believed to have been a factor in 
their success. The integration of the courts into the community and the participatory aspect of 
their processes have brought about concrete results; Rwandans have seen justice being done for 
the crimes committed throughout the country.30 The Gacaca process is largely viewed as having 
                                                          
26 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012.  
27 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
28 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012.  
29 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf  
30 KOK, N. (2012) “The closing of the Gacaca Courts and the implications for Access to Justice in Rwanda”, Institute for 
Security Studies. 
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facilitated effective reconciliation within Rwandan communities; during the genocide many crimes 
committed were by nature ‘intra-community’; an important factor in the long term reintegration 
of perpetrators.31 Today, genocidaires live side by side with victims, something that would have 
previously been unimaginable.32 Community participation has proven an effective means of 
establishing the truth in many of the Gacaca trials.  
 The focus placed by the Gacaca on forgiveness and on frank and open discussion is largely 
seen as positive by participants in trials, as it enables the sharing of stories and experiences by 
survivors of the genocide; something which can provide not only catharsis but crucial 
acknowledgment of the harms suffered by victims.33 Conversely, for some participants, the Gacaca 
process may in fact retraumatise them, and open up past wounds.34 Despite this, it cannot be 
denied that the Gacaca process creates a platform for dialogue regarding the genocide among civil 
society, making sure that the genocide and its effects are not forgotten or undermined.35 The 
ongoing engagement with the entire spectrum of groups within civil society in the context of the 
Gacaca has been key to maintaining a peaceful democratic state in Rwanda.36 Moreover, Gacaca 
courts are seen to have significantly aided healing and reconciliation on a national level, things 
which are essential to long lasting peace, stability and empowerment of the Rwandan people.37   
Challenges faced by the Gacaca 
 
 While the benefits of the Gacaca courts are numerous, scepticism and even concern have 
been expressed with regards to the ability of these courts to provide access to fair justice for all 
Rwandans. Some of these concerns include their capacity to deal effectively with the extremely 
                                                          
31 KOK, N. (2012) “The closing of the Gacaca Courts and the implications for Access to Justice in Rwanda”, Institute for 
Security Studies. 
32 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
33 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
34 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
35 BOMKAMM, P. (2012) “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation”. Oxford Monographs In 
International Humanitarian And Criminal Law, 162. 
36 BOMKAMM, P. (2012) “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation”. Oxford Monographs In 
International Humanitarian And Criminal Law, 162. 




large caseload faced by the Gacaca courts; issues surrounding the impartiality and independence 
of the Gacaca’s many ‘lay’ judges; and the right of defendents to a completely fair trial.38 
 At the time of establishing the Gacaca courts, many international human rights 
organisations voiced apprehension with regards to the following, which were seen as potential 
obstacles to access to justice for participants in Gacaca processes: the fact that most genocide 
perpetratore did not have the financial means to offer compensation to their victims; the fact that 
state resources were inadequate to implement a nationwide compensation scheme and also to 
establish a comprehensive community service scheme; and the fact that the training of 
Inyangamugayo judges was seen to be largely insufficient.39 The fact that Gacaca judges have no 
formal legal background (and often no formal education of any kind) and that the defendant has 
no formal legal representation, has meant that the process is often viewed as flawed when 
compared to international standards.40 Another concern has been the absence of remuneration 
for judges, which is seen to increase the likelihood of corruption within the Gacaca judiciary.41 
 Some reports claim that the involvement of Rwanda’s entire adult population has been 
central to the success of the Gacaca courts.42 However there is debate as to whether the Gacaca 
courts have in fact achieved the popular participation that was intended to prevent the system 
being abused. It was hoped that through community participation, community members would 
speak up when they saw false evidence being presented, either for or against the defendant. Yet 
some studies indicate the fact that fears of individuals, surrounding the possibility that speaking 
out could lead to retribution, have proven to be an obstacle to unhindered participation.43 What’s 
more, in this scenario, the outcomes of the Gacaca processes could be influenced by those holding 
the economic, political and coercive power in the community, to the detriment of the individuals 
involved. 
                                                          
38 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf  
39 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf  
40 “Justice Compromised: The legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts” Human Rights Watch, Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf; 
41 BOMKAMM, P (2012). Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, Oxford Monographs in International 
Humanitarian and Criminal Law, 162. 
42 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf  
43 “Justice Compromised: The legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts” Human Rights Watch, Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf; BOMKAMM, P. (2012) “Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation”. Oxford Monographs In International Humanitarian And Criminal Law, 160. 
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 A key issue of concern has been the quality of justice offered by the Gacaca courts. It has 
been claimed that many prisoners (suspected genocide killers) were in fact victims of false 
testimony. In addition, a number of prisoners’ records are said to have been incomplete or even 
non-existent, making it difficult to ascertain a fair trial for them.44 
The issue of reparations in the context of the Gacaca courts has also proved to be 
contentious. Reparations, including compensation, are a vital part of post-conflict reconciliation 
processes, and are a significant aspect of transitional justice, as they acknowledge harms done and 
losses suffered, and often represent healing for both individuals and communities. Most guilty 
verdicts in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts have resulted in community service sentences, which came to 
constitute an alternative to prison sentences for many; comprising unpaid work to be performed 
within the community. While the community services approach has its merits; namely the fact that 
it has proven to be a viable solution to the overcrowding of Rwanda’s prisons, some have 
questioned whether such sentences can be considered to be sufficiently serious for the crimes in 
question. A number of survivors expressed concerns relating to security; questioning for example 
the wisdom of reinserting so many detainees back into their communities. Many questioned the 
effect this approach would have on genocide survivors; for example the widows and orphans who 
would have to live side by side with the very people who killed their relatives.45 There is therefore 
a perception by some that it is the perpetrators, rather than the victims of genocide, who have 
benefitted from the government’s need to reduce crowding in prisons.46 The relatively lenient 
sentencing given by the Gacaca also led to concerns that false confessions by prisoners were 
taking place, in order that they leave the abhorent prison conditions and take advantage of the 
plea bargaining system to receive a sentence of community service.47 Despite such concerns, 
finding an alternative to the community service programme offered by the Gacaca would have 
been challenging given the very immediate crisis of prison overcrowding throughout the country. 
An ongoing issue of contention within the context of the Gacaca is that of sexual violence. 
Sexual crimes were originally classed as ‘category one’ crimes, which could only be tried in the 
                                                          
44 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf 
45 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf 
46 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
47 CLARK, Phil. “The legacy of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”. Availabke at http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/legacy-gacaca-
courts-genocide, accessed March 23, 2012. 
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conventional court system,48 but in 2008 it was decided that this category of crimes would be tried 
in the Gacaca,49 citing the fact that many victims were dying from AIDS and would not live to 
attend the process, as justification. One of the negative aspects of this was seen to be the 
subjecting of victims of sexual crimes including rape and torture, to very public community 
hearings,50 something which could inhibit some victims’ participation or retraumatise victims.  
A final considerable issue of the Gacaca process is that is seen by some to deliver ‘victor’s 
justice’ by Tutsis against Hutus, thus stigmatising the entire Hutu population and ‘tacitly 
reinforcing the idea of collective guilt’.51 While it has been reported that the majority of genocide 
crimes were committed by Hutus, the idea of collective responsibility by all Hutus for the Rwandan 
genocide is erroneous, with thousands of Hutus being killed in revenge attacks towards the end of 
the genocide, for example.52 Shortly after his election, Rwanda’s President Kagame launched a 
campaign in 2004 to remove war crimes from the jurisdiction of the Gacaca, deciding that the 
crimes of the Patriotic Front of Rwanda (RPF) should not be tried.53 Such an approach clearly raises 
questions surrounding access to justice for the Hutus of Rwanda; while making the Gacaca 
accessible to Tutsis.54 It is possible that this will have lasting consequences for a peaceful and 
democratic Rwanda, leaving aggrieved victims exacerbated by a lack of remedy,55 and allowing 




                                                          
48 TIEMESSEN, A. (2004). After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 61. 
49 “Justice Compromised: The legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts” Human Rights Watch, Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf 
50 “Justice Compromised: The legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts” Human Rights Watch, Available at 
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51 “Eight Years On… A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda”, 14. Penal Reform International. (2010).  Available at 
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none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda. 
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President Paul Kagame was the military leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front that defeated the Hutu forces in 1994. He 
was elected President in 2000.    
54 Many Hutus were killed by other Hutus for opposing the genocide. Hutu survivors are able to seek justice in the Gacaca for 
these crimes, but for those who suffered at the hands of the RPF there is no remedy. 
55 TIEMESSEN, A. (2004) “After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 
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Selected Issues of Access to Justice 
 
 In the following section, some key socio-legal issues of access to justice are addressed, namely 
those of procedural autonomy, ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’ and the recourse to ADR. It is argued that in 
order for transitional strategies to be effective, victims of rights violations should be able to decide whether 
and how to deal with the disputes in which they are involved. Transitional justice strategies must therefore 
include programmes which aim at implementing a wide range of dispute resolution processes, including the 
recourse to mechanisms of traditional justice as well as more formal justice mechanisms. In so doing, 
particular attention must be paid to avoiding power imbalances and coercion during the dispute resolution 
process. Linking together access to justice and alternative dispute resolution would mean more affordable 
and therefore more accessible mechanisms of settlement, it would also give the opportunity for the 
violation of diffuse and group interests to be dealt with. In addition to the simple resolution of disputes, 
transitional justice strategies, drawing upon access to justice, should include awareness programmes and 
should prioritise the involvement of local communities and every level of civil society. 
 
Individual Autonomy as Procedural Autonomy56  
 
 Individual autonomy is a broad concept. It includes the possibility for individuals to express 
their own identity. Nevertheless, to express one’s identity requires defences that will protect 
against violations. The concept of ‘autonomy’ opens up a number of complex debates57 and issues 
across several areas of research, including philosophy, politics, and economics.58 Autonomy has 
been examined as a social relationship,59 and as a characteristic of human will and personality, in 
addition to as a normative principle.60 Furthermore, autonomy has been interpreted and 
associated with empowerment, especially in the sphere of minority groups and women’s rights.61 
Crucially, autonomy has opened the doors for the right to participation, especially in the case of 
                                                          
56 This section is based on the published essay Individual Autonomy, Public Wrongs and Sexual Orientation: the Italian Case 
in Comparative Perspective, Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. IV, Issue 2, 29-43. 
57 BAYNES, Kenneth. (2007) “Freedom and Autonomy” in Brian, Leiter and Michael, Rosen (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Continental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 551-587. 
58 BAVETTA, Sebastiano and Francesco, GUALA (2003) “Autonomy-Freedom and Deliberation”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 
Vol. 15, 423-443.  
59 OSHANA, Marina. (2006) “Personal Autonomy in Society”, Aldershot: Aldgate Publishing. 
60 HEYWOOD, Andrew. (1994) “Political Ideas and Concepts.” London: The MacMillan Press. 
61 FRIEDMAN, Marilyn (2003) “Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Studies in Feminist Philosophy)”. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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the rights of the child. As Baynes62 argues, autonomy is a fluid and complex term, with several 
dimensions that involve both the private and public life of the individual. 
In the present paper, the notion of individual autonomy draws upon three sources that 
recall issues of the expression of personal identity and access to justice. The first source is 
Nietzsche’s63 characterisation of freedom as autonomy, as synthesised in the sentence ‘we, 
however, want to become those we are’. The approach of Nietzsche is important here because it 
speaks to the concepts of identity and empowerment as those exemplified by social movements 
seeking to gain rights for minority groups such as ethnic, national, linguistic or sexual minorities. 
This component of individual autonomy is both purely private and personal, and yet not entirely 
separate from the surrounding community.64  
  Secondly, the interpretation of individual autonomy may also take inspiration from 
anthropological research on the relationship between the autonomy of the individual and the 
community in societies, such as, for example, the Igbo in Nigeria and the Bakrawallah in the 
Himalayas.65 The study of these and of other traditional societies focuses attention on two main 
considerations. Firstly, individual autonomy and its exercise, maintained by different societies, is 
rooted in distinctive ideas, which different societies maintain, regarding age, gender and economic 
status.66 Consequently, the concept of autonomy varies cross-culturally. Secondly, the value of 
preserving harmony (Nader, 1990) within a community, on the one hand, may limit individual 
autonomy, but on the other hand, may also offer opportunities for reconciliation and for 
compensation for harm caused. Indeed, popular justice and extra-judicial dispute resolution 
processes demonstrate the way in which the notion of individual autonomy also includes 
procedural autonomy (Nader and Todd, 1978). Mauro Cappelletti observes that the right of a party 
to initiate legal action has ‘historically emerged as a fundamental guarantee of civil procedure’ 
(1972-1973:652). 
The final source informing the understanding of the concept of individual autonomy is to 
be found in international and national legal statutes dealing with self-determination, the right to 
legislative protection, and the right to effective remedies against violation. In particular, articles 7 
                                                          
62 BAYNES, Kenneth. (2007) “Freedom and Autonomy” in Brian, Leiter and Michael, Rosen (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Continental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 551-587. 
63 NIETZSCHE, Friederich Wilhelm (2001) “The Gay Science: with a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs.” 
Edited by Bernard, Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
64 WHITE, Richard. (1997) “Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty”. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
65 RAO, Aparna. (1998) “Autonomy: Life Cycle, Gender and Status among Himalayan Pastoralists.” New York: Berghahn Books. 
66 RAO, Aparna. (1998) “Autonomy: Life Cycle, Gender and Status among Himalayan Pastoralists.” New York: Berghahn Books. 
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and 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state that ‘all are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law’ (art. 7), and that ‘everyone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or by law (art. 8). The right to equal protection of the law and the 
right to effective remedy are replicated in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
Thus, the notion of autonomy emphasises that individuals are naturally free to express 
their own identity. In order to protect this identity from violation, access to courts or to the 
remedies provided by other processes, such as those offered by alternative dispute resolution 
methods, should be readily available to everyone. Violations of rights in conflict affected societies 
impact on the rights of entire groups of people. Such violations are often not ‘transformed’ into 
disputes because of several social factors. Therefore, procedural autonomy means that victims of 
conflicts should first be made aware of the violations suffered, and then have access to a wide 
range of dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, the concept of personal autonomy is linked to 
the idea of ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’, discussed briefly earlier, which is analysed in greater 
detail in the following section. 
 
Fitting the Forum to the Fuss 
 
 The expression ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’ was coined by Sander and Goldberg (1994: 
49) to refer to the search for the appropriate dispute resolution process in each individual case. 
Several different factors, including the characteristics of the case, the goals of the parties and the 
characteristics of the parties (Sander and Rozdeiczer, 2005) need to be taken into account in 
choosing the most appropriate dispute resolution process in every situation. Matching cases to 
their approproate dispute resolution procedures should perhaps be the most important aim of a 
dispute resolution process, yet such a goal is rarely easy to implement and frequently overlooked. 
It is argued here that the approach of Sander, Goldberg and Rozdeiczer overlooks two important 
considerations, namely the existence of a legal framework entitling individuals to vindicate their 
rights, and the availability of different dispute resolution procedures. It is often the case that it is 
only when there are legal provisions protecting those rights that have been infringed that the 
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parties of a dispute are able to freely decide whether, and how, to resolve their dispute. 
Therefore, in transitional post conflict societies, where the judiciary may have collapsed, for 
instance, and the framework of former legal institutions no longer exists, a legal vacuum can often 
represent an obstacle to the resolution of disputes. Such limitations might be overcome through 
the use of systems of informal justice, in the case that they are suitable. It is suggested here that 
such mechanisms should be shaped depending on the social and cultural context in which they are 
adopted. However, despite their advantages, as is explained in the following section, systems of 
informal justice also entail several contentious issues of their own, which must be taken into 
account when considering the most appropriate forum. 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
 The main objective of the ‘third wave’ of the Access to Justice Movement discussed earlier 
has been to go beyond advocacy and legal aid. The third wave can be referred to as ‘the access-to-
justice’ approach, because it is comprehensive and dynamic, and aims to improve a wide variety of 
reforms within civil procedure and dispute processing in general. This ‘wave’ includes reforms of 
the structure of the courts, reforms in the legal profession and reforms providing the use of ADR. 
Taking into account the fact that disputes present different characteristics and effects, and that 
the parties in question must also to be taken into consideration, the third wave aims to relate and 
adapt the civil process to the type of dispute in question. In the acknowledgement of this third 
wave it came too the recognition that ‘it is necessary to see the role and importance of the 
different factors and barriers involved in order to design effective machinery and institutions to 
cope with them’ (Cappelletti, pp.54 General Report).  
 From this premise, the ADR movement began, at the end of 1960s. ADR and transitional 
justice are, as suggested by Alberstein (2011), inherently connected. A vitally important question 
for victims of conflict is how best to deal with their disputes and grievances. In jurisdictions in 
which recourse to courts may not be possible or is very difficult, recourse to extrajudicial dispute 
resolution processes can represent a favorable solution. Roberts and Palmer present a model 
demonstrating the differing processes used in dealing with a dispute (2005). This model can be 
applied to any society, and can help to understand more clearly the relationship between local 
culture and decisions regarding the resolution of disputes. Roberts and Palmer argue that in any 
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society there is a range of possibilities for dealing with a perceived infringement of an individual’s 
rights. In particular the varieties of response include avoidance and self-help at opposite ends of 
the spectrum. In between these two points, there are settlement focused, talking responses which 
are characterised by the presence or absence of third-party intervention, and where the basic 
models are represented by negotiation, mediation and umpiring (Roberts and Palmer, 2005). 
These are subject to all sorts of particular nuances and variations in real life, and are elaborated in 
various ways within the ADR movement. Notwithstanding variations, these three forms should be 
seen as the foundational types of dispute process where communication takes place with the 
intention of securing some kind of resolution.  
 Although in the common law world it is commonly argued that ADR represents something 
of a new movement, alternative to the court system, Roberts and Palmer show that systems of 
informal justice, or out-of-court settlement, were and remain present across a wide range of 
cultures (2005; 2007). Several impulses towards the use of informal and popular justice can be 
identified. In the analysis of Roberts and Palmer, mechanisms of informal justice have the 
following characteristics. 
Institutions that are: 
 non-bureaucratic in structure and relatively undifferentiated from society, relying on small, 
local fora that can deal with the social relationships of the parties, 
 local in nature and relying on local rather than professional or official language,  
 avoid official law, and resolves disputes by means other than the public application of the 
rules of published law,  
 rely on substantive and procedural ‘rules’ that are vague, unwritten, flexible, and based on 
good common sense and everyday language, so that ‘the law’ does not stand in the way of 
achieving substantive justice, and  
 promote harmony between the parties and within local communities, and get to the ‘real’ 
cause of the problem(s) (Palmer and Roberts, 2007: 422). 
 
 Accordingly, in societies which have been affected by conflict or non democratic systems of 
governance, structures of informal, extrajudicial, justice can be suitable in particular for the 
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empowerment of the local people, as demonstrated by the earlier example of gacaca courts in 
post-conflict Rwanda, wherein a community-based approach in dealing with disputes is adopted. 
 Despite its benefits, several critiques have also been moved against the use of ADR and 
systems of popular justice. It has been argued that power imbalances (Fiss, 1984), abuses towards 
minorities and women (Grillo, 1991), manipulations by the state (de Sousa Santos, 1982), 
suppression of consciousness of inequalities in social and political decisions (Nader, 1990), and 
unhealthy expansion of state power (Abel, 1982) can all be factors of ADR. With this in mind, in 
the specific case of transitional and post conflict societies, a possible danger is that the aim of 
overcoming periods of violations, and the wish to restore harmony in the community where there 
is conflict, means that limited attention is paid to the personal choice and emotions of individuals. 
More specifically, disputants might be influenced to settle. Coertion and power imbalances during 





 The present study has shown the manner in which transitional justice strategies can be 
more effective when recourse is made to the principles of access to justice and ADR. Such 
recourse first means that legal aid, public interest law, and general reforms to litigation systems 
must be made applicable to transitional justice strategies; and secondly, focus should be placed on 
the active role that victims of violations and conflict in general can play during the transitional 
period of a post conflict society. In particular, victims must have the possibility of resolving 
disputes in the manner in which they feel most comfortable and which allows greater access to 
justice. With this in mind, courts and informal systems of dispute resolution should be made 
available to individuals and groups of people.  
As Cappelletti and Garth have argued, ‘the identification of barriers to effective equality of 
arms is the first task in giving meaning to effectiveness’ (1978: 10). Accordingly, the idea that 
procedural autonomy is involved in the broad concept of individual autonomy is emerging as an 
effective resource for the enforcement of measures against discrimination and violation of rights. 
The notion of  individual autonomy emphasises that individuals are naturally free to express their 
own identity, and access to higher courts or the remedies provided by other processes, such as 
those offered by alternative dispute resolution, should be readily available to every individual, in 
order to ensure protection from violations of this identity. Procedural autonomy is therefore 
integral to the notion of ‘fitting the forum to the fuss’, as it allows for the possibility of making 
available the most appropriate dispute resolution process.  
 This paper has analysed two examples of transitional justice, namely Gacaca courts in 
Rwanda, and community reconciliation processes in Timor-Leste. These case studies emphasise 
the importance of the involvement of post-conflict communities, and the adoption of traditional 
systems of dispute resolution in successful transitional justice processes.  
 Above all, it must be remembered that access to justice, when applied to the concept of 
transitional justice, means that traditional systems and fora of dispute resolution must be based 
on the principles of human rights, and must aim at broader reforms, which go beyond the 
resolution of single disputes and make justice more accessible to civil society as a whole. A first 
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fundamental step in this direction is to make individuals aware and conscious of violations and of 
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